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Abstract
Anchoring is a well-known decision-making bias: original guesses for a certain ques-
tion could act as anchors and could influence our final answers. Reference prices –
in a similar fashion – can lead to a bias in consumer valuations, and thus consumer
demand will be coherent but not one derived from a utility framework. In our paper
we investigate the effect of the existence of anchoring on how oligopolistic firms might
change their pricing strategy. More specifically, we analyze the effect of anchoring on
pricing when differentiated firms compete in Bertrand fashion. We show that if the
anchoring effect is smaller than a threshold the average price is lower compared to the
no-anchoring case.
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1 Introduction
Even though economic models usually posit rational actors, behavioral economics have es-
tablished the existence of quite a handful of well-researched decision-making biases. One
of these is anchoring, which refers to the phenomenon that original guesses for a certain
question could act as anchors and could influence our final answers. For example if we are
asked first whether we would be willing to pay $10 for a watch, our valuation for it could be
lower then if we are first asked a similar question but with $1000. Of course, this is clearly
not consistent with our model of the rational consumers who derive their valuations from
their system of preferences.
Many studies tried to deepen our understanding of this regular quirk of consumer behav-
ior. Tversky and Kahneman [1974] asked subjects about the percentage of African nations
in the United Nations. However, firstly a wheel of fortune (with numbers between 0 and 100)
was used to obtain an initial guess and before giving their own guess, the subjects had to
answer whether the percentage is higher or lower than the one drawn. This chance number
has clearly influenced the final guess given by the subject. Early research on anchoring and
reference points and the connection of these phenomena with prospect theory is presented
by Kahneman [1992].
Northcraft and Neale [1987] have shown that experts are also susceptible to this phe-
nomenon. Students and real estate agents had to make pricing choices about properties
they were shown. According to the results of the experiment, subjects in both groups were
influenced by the other listings provided before the decision.
Kalyanaram and Winer [1995] have found three general conclusions based on the pre-
vious empirical literature. Reference prices do have a non-neglectable effect on consumer
valuations, past prices play an important role in shaping this reference price and in a way
not inconsistent with loss aversion, there is an asymmetrical reaction to price increases and
price decreases.
Ariely et al. [2003] carried out ground-breaking experiments on how anchoring affects
consumer valuation. They have found that the last digits of the social security numbers –
used in a similar fashion as the wheel of fortune in the experiment by Tversky and Kahneman
– could be used to influence the subjects’ willingness to pay. At the same time, the valuation
of related products is also influenced in a consistent fashion. To use the example of one of
the experiments detailed in the article: recalling the last two digits of the Social Security
Number in a priming question influences how much someone is willing to pay for a bottle
of average wine, but everyone is willing to pay more for a bottle of ”rare” wine than for the
”average” one. Subjects acted in a somewhat similar way when their willingness-to-accept
was tested. The originally provided anchor influenced how much they accepted to endure
a 30-second high-pitched voice, however the sums accepted for a 10-second or a 60-second
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voice were consistent with this. The authors thus find that valuations are originally resilient.
After the encounter with an anchor however, they have been ”imprinted”, and they create
a system of valuations that is internally consistent, even though its foundation (the anchor)
was arbitrary.
Simonson and Drolet [2004] investigated whether there is an asymmetric anchoring effect
on willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept. They have found that although smaller
differences might exist, the impacts of anchoring are very similar in these cases. In the
experiment some subjects set selling prices under the assumption that they want to sell
their item, while others were instructed to assume that they are not sure whether they want
to sell. The experiment has shown that anchoring effects are the strongest if there is an
uncertainty in the desire to trade. Nunes and Boatwright [2004] argued that anchors can
effect the willingness-to-pay in case of unrelated goods as well. In their experiment they have
found that displaying a T-shirt with an expensive ($80) or a cheap ($10) price tag at their
stand affected how much visitors are willing to pay for the CD they were selling. They used
the term ”incidental prices” for the advertised or observed prices of completely unrelated
products which were still able to influence consumer decisions.
Amir et al. [2008] asked the question whether there is a strong relationship between
predicted pleasure (utility) and reservation prices. Subjects had to answer survey questions
about a hypothetical concert where different cues where given about the details of the event.
They have found that there is no such relationship: some cues (like the production costs)
would affect the reservation price, other factors (like the details about the temperature in
the auditorium) would affect predicted pleasure. This further hints towards the fact that
numerical data which does not affect utility (such as past prices) can affect consumers’
willingnesses to pay and thus demand.Beggs and Graddy [2009] have shown that data from
art auctions strongly supports the existence of the anchoring effect amongst buyers in this
market.
Baucells et al. [2011] based on their laboratory experiment tried to estimate how subjects
create reference prices. According to their model, early and most recent data gets a larger
weight, while intermediate data gets a lower weight. Adaval and Wyer Jr [2011] found that
extreme prices can serve as anchors not only for related goods, but unrelated products as
well if anchoring occurs unconsciously, when consumers encounter prices by chance.On the
other hand, if the consumer consciously seeks out information on prices, the anchors will
only influence the valuations of similar products.
However, Fudenberg et al. [2012] raised questions regarding the robustness of anchoring
results. Their laboratory experiments regarding common market goods and lotteries have
found only very weak effect on the subjects’ willingness to pay. Mazar et al. [2013] on the
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other hand argue that market dependent valuations1 support the hypothesis that consumers
focus on other factors then the utility obtained from consuming the product and thus could
hint at the significance of anchoring. In their experiments, they exposed potential buyers
of mugs and gift vouchers to different a priori price distributions before soliciting their
valuations. They have found that the exposure to different price distributions had significant
effect on the subjects’ willingnesses-to-pay.
As seen above, the study of price anchoring as a phenomenon has a very expansive liter-
ature, however, the logical follow-up of behavioral economics findings (as seen for example
in Koszegi and Rabin [2006], Schipper [2009], or in Jansen et al. [2009]) would be to extend
our previous models of consumer behavior and markets using these results. The first step
in this direction was taken by Nasiry and Popescu [2011], who have investigated the effect
of anchoring on the dynamic pricing problem of the monopoly and found that ignoring the
behavioral effects can lead to under- or overpricing. Under the peak-end rule they applied
(ie. the reference price is a combination of the lowest price and the last price), they have
shown that optimal price path will always be monotone; thus the monopoly will employ
skimming or penetration pricing.
In this paper we continue this direction by incorporating the effects of anchoring into
oligopoly models. Even though one might expect that firms can exploit anchoring to increase
their revenues, as they are able to do in other cases of consumer bias2, we find that in our
finite-horizon Bertrand game, anchoring can lead to lower prices on average. Furthermore,
we find stronger price-decreasing effect in less competitive markets, thus the existence of
anchoring in some sense protects the consumers from firms taking advantage of product
differentiation.
In Section 2, we formally describe our oligopoly game and solve it for the equilibrium
values. Based on this, in Section 3, we compare the benchmark no-anchoring case to the
anchoring case, thus investigating the effects of anchoring. Finally, we reiterate and discuss
our results in Section 4.
1I.e the phenomenon that the valuation of the consumer is influenced by the prices encountered in the
market.
2See e.g. Koszegi et al. [2012] or Wenzel [2014].
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2 The Model
Suppose that two firms produce differentiated products with zero marginal costs.3 Demands
are given by (i = 1, 2)4:
Di,t(pt, rt) = di,t(pt) + ht(rt, pi,t) (1)
where pt = (p1,t, p2,t), di,t(pt) = 1 − pi,t + βpj,t and 0 < β < 1, while t = 1, . . . , T .
Furthermore, ht(rt, pi,t) captures the price anchoring effect, with rt representing the reference
price in period t. We assume, that ht(rt, pi,t) = λ(
∑
i pi,t−1/2 − pi,t), where λ ∈ (0, 1) and
h1(·, ·) = 0.5 That is, we assume that the effective reference price in period t is the industry
average price of period t− 1.6
For the sake of simplicity, we solve the game for T = 2 using backward induction. In this
case firms’ profit functions in period 2 can be written as (i = 1, 2):
pii,2(p2) = pi,2Di,2(p2, r2)
= pi,2
[
1− pi,2 + βpj,2 + λ
(∑
i pi,1
2
− pi,2
)]
(2)
Maximozing (2) with respect to pi,2 and imposing symmetry, we have that:
p∗i,2 =
λ
∑
i pi,1 + 2
2[2(1 + λ)− β] for i = 1, 2. (3)
Firms’ objective functions in the first period are (i = 1, 2):
Πi(p1) = pii,1 + pii,2 = pi,1di,1(p1) + pi,2Di,2(p2, r2)
= pi,1(1− pi,1 + βpj,1) + pi,2
[
1− pi,2 + βpj,2 + λ
(∑
i pi,1
2
− pi,2
)]
(4)
Plugging into this pi,2 given by (3) and maximizing it with respect to pi,1, yields to:
Lemma 1 Equilibrium prices and profits are as follows:
p∗i,1 =
(1 + λ)[4(1− β) + 5λ] + β2
(2− β)3 + 4(2− β)2λ+ (7− 4β)λ2 − λ3
3All our results would hold if we assume positive marginal costs, however the expressions would be more
complicated. Therefore, for simplicity, we assume symmetric firms with zero marginal costs.
4Our demand function is based on Nasiry and Popescu [2011].
5We restrict our attention to cases when gains and losses have symmetric effects. That is, we use the
same λ even when the actual price is higher or lower than the average price of the previous period.
6As pointed out by Biswas et al. [1999], the competitors’ prices can also influence the reference price for
a product.
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p∗i,2 =
(2− β + λ)[2(1 + λ)− β]
(2− β)3 + 4(2− β)2λ+ (7− 4β)λ2 − λ3
and
pi∗i =
β4(2 + λ)− β3(1 + λ)(16 + 5λ) + 8β2(1 + λ)2(6 + λ)
[(7− 4β)λ2 + 4(2− β)2λ+ (2− β)3 − λ3]2
−β(1 + λ)
2[λ(68 + 3λ) + 64]− (1 + λ)3[(32− λ)λ+ 32]
[(7− 4β)λ2 + 4(2− β)2λ+ (2− β)3 − λ3]2
for i = 1, 2.
Comparing equilibrium prices we have that firms set higher prices in the first period than in
the second period. The intuition behind this is that in the first period they give up sales in
order to provide a high anchor for the second period, where they can finally reap what they
have sown, so to speak. More formally:
Remark 1 p∗i,2 < p
∗
i,1 for i = 1, 2, whenever β ∈ (0, 1).
3 Results
To examine the effect of price anchoring, let us consider the case when there is no price
anchoring. In this case firms’ per period profits can be given as (i = 1, 2):
pii,t(pt) = pi,tdi,t(pt) = pi,t(1− pi,t + βpj,t) (5)
Maximizing (5) with respect to pi,t (i, t = 1, 2), straightforward computation yields to:
Lemma 2 With no price anchoring in equilibrium firms choose p∗∗i,t =
1
2−β in each sequence
of period and profits can be given by:
pi∗∗i =
2(1 + β)
(2− β)2
for i = 1, 2.
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 1 If β is sufficiently small the average price of the two periods is lower com-
pared to the no-anchoring case.
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Proof: To show this, we need: ∑2
t=1 p
∗
i,t
2
< p∗∗i,t
Plugging into this the equilibrium prices we have that
−2β2 + β(7λ+ 8)− (λ+ 1)(7λ+ 8)
2 [(4β − 7)λ2 − 4(β − 2)2λ+ (β − 2)3 + λ3] <
1
2− β
This inequality holds true whenever:
β < β ≡ 1− λ

This result is depicted on Figure 1. The shaded area corresponds to the cases when
anchoring yields lower average prices.
β
1
λ1
Figure 1: Change of average prices.
Remark 2 Notice, that the output-weighted average price is even lower than the average
price, since with anchoring the second period equilibrium prices are lower and the equilibrium
quantities are greater than in the first period.
The intuition behind the above result is that in the first period, firms are increasing
prices in order to create a favorable anchor for the second period where they can make up
for the lost sales. However, prices in a Bertrand setup are strategic complements, hence
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when demands are more interrelated, this leads to a more significant price increase in the
first period. Of course this implies that the firms are also able to charge a higher price in
the second period as well. Therefore the average price increases if the products are close
substitutes and decreases when demands are relatively independent of each other.
Proposition 2 There is a threshold β such that if β < β, then pi∗i > pi
∗∗
i for i = 1, 2.
Proof: Solving pi∗i − pi∗∗i > 0 we get the following critical product differentiation level
β < β
where β is the smallest root of the polynomial equation 2β7 − β6(24 + 17λ) + β5(53λ2 +
169λ+ 120)− β4(68λ3 + 416λ2 + 672λ+ 320) + β3(19λ4 + 390λ3 + 1227λ2 + 1336λ+ 480) +
β2(17λ5− 73λ4− 765λ3− 1619λ2− 1328λ− 384) + β(2λ6− 16λ5 + 114λ4 + 556λ3 + 824λ2 +
528λ+ 128) + 2λ6 − 24λ5 − 82λ4 − 84λ3 − 28λ2 = 0 
Proposition 2 suggests that anchoring can be beneficial for firms if the degree of product
differentiation is sufficiently high. Furthermore, according to Proposition 1 if β < β then
consumers benefit from price anchoring as well. Since β < β for every λ ∈ (0, 1), these
results yield to the following:
Corollary 1 If β < β, the existence of price anchoring increases social welfare.
4 Conclusion
Previous literature warns us that in certain cases firms are able to exploit consumer bias
to increase their profits, while harming their consumers. Anchoring is well-known and well-
researched bias for psychologists as well as marketing professionals. Little research was done
however on the issue how price anchoring affects the conclusions of our market models. To
at least partially answer this question, we investigated these effects within a finite horizon
Bertrand game with differentiated products. We assumed that the average price of the
previous period serves as an anchor for the consumers, furthermore we assumed that this
fact is common knowledge for the firms. Solving our model, we find that in the case of
anchoring, the consumer bias might lead to lower prices. Somewhat surprisingly, we also
find that this price-lowering effect is more likely in more differentiated markets, thus firms
with higher market power are even less likely to exploit anchoring. Furthermore, we have
shown that in the case of highly differentiated products, anchoring most certainly increases
social welfare.
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